because of the provision in the patriot act. you were in congress when they passed the patriot act. did you understand, when you voted for and supported the patriot act, that it would be used for the bulk collection of everybody's home records in the united states? >> i understood that we needed to collect records in order to, through all the means we have discussed in prior panels -- in order to find those people in the united states or outside the united states, who are linked to people in the united states, who are trying to harm us after 9/11. i voted for a program that authorized people, under strict supervision, to figure out the best way to do that. i do not think, as a sitting member of congress, and someone who knows intelligence but is not a trained intelligence analyst, that i am the best person to decide the parameters of the program. congress narrowed some of the

initial proposals, and we sunsetted this. it has to be renewed every three years. i think this is important. >> i think people thought it would be used for the purpose raj is explaining. >> business records, phone company records -- exactly how it would be implemented, i trusted people to implement it fairly, because those in congress who were on the relevant committees played -- certainly i did -- a major role in overseeing what was happening. i left the intelligence community at the end of 2006, but headed the homeland committee for another four years. did i oversee every single bit of it? no. do i think that maybe now that there is a much more public debate, congress should narrow some of these provisions? yes. congress did narrow some of these provisions. there was the library provision.

a human going to the library and taking out a book -- who could see that? there are often internets at libraries. in case anybody missed it, a lot of the way communication works between bad guys and bad guys is through the internet. those sites, maybe, ought to be subject to the provisions of section 215. once it was narrowed to clarify that grandma was exempted, congress did that, in response to public outcry. people have known about this program. it was revealed in the "new york times" in 2005. george bush partially declassified it. i learned, for the first time, to my extreme dismay, that in the first 3.5 years of

this program, the president had used his article to authority to run the program, rather than the provisions of law, fica, which congress enacted in 1978, the foreign intelligence surveillance act was passed in 1978 in response to the abuses of the nixon administration and the recommendation of the church commission. it set up a careful system of a fisa court, an intelligence committee on the hill was set up then to monitor these applications. it worked very well, in my view, through 2001. congress after that pulled it back. i believe strongly that may the amount of metadata is excessive. i am sure my buddy thinks this. that ought to be debated.

maybe the program should be narrowed. there has been robust oversight over the years. >> i want to be clear on this. who can accesses data and for what purposes? >> i think this was in a letter that went to the hill yesterday. papers were sent to congress in 2009. i cannot speak to any individual member of congress that is currently now with the knowledge of the program. in terms of access, access is strictly controlled. in order to create the data, one has to have reasonable suspicion

that there is a tie to a specific terrorist group that is identified in the court order. >> just a terrorist group. if there is a foreign espionage group and i think my target is about to leave united states, i need to check out this phone number to see if he is in communication with a co- conspirator, are you going given that information? >> it is illegal. >> how does he get to the information? >> ask again? [laughter] we are friends, but not that close. >> how would you get that information? >> let me back up from the specifics for a minute and quickly get to that. in any investigation, the fbi and the intelligence community are working seamlessly in a way

that did not happen before 9/11. when jay was the general counsel, there were weeks when we had many occasions where we had to talk. we work closely with the military with various command forces. there are conversations occurring across the law enforcement communities in ways which are helpful in terms of permissible information sharing and dot-connecting. to your specific question, if there was an operational terrorist within the united states, i would hope that we would already have their number. >> not a terrorist, i said a spy. >> there certainly have been examples where there were individuals in this country. we prosecuted a couple in my office.

one was an unregistered agent of the i.s.i. those individuals came to our attention and investigations and sued. we were able to obtain the information. >> i'm asking a specific question about how you get records and phone numbers, ongoing investigations that have real-time consequences. could be a drug cartel that is importing guns on the street and were used in five murders in the last several months. you need this information right away and you want to know who is making phone calls. how do you get the information? you can get it, can't you? >> sure. by a subpoena, an informant, any number of ways.

criminal investigations, our ability to identify where an alleged that guy lives or their phone number or their e-mail address, our ability to find it is not all that difficult. >> you can get it pretty quickly. if you needed for an ongoing investigation, somebody's about to leave the country, you need that phone number in order to get a search warrant, you can get that pretty quickly, don't you? >> it would depend on the case. what is being described, your example, i think, contemplates a known individual who has been under the scrutiny of the law enforcement or other agencies. at the micro level, it is not a difficult thing in our investigation.

>> i guess the question is, since he can get the information he needs pretty quickly, for a lot of serious investigations that have operational components, why can't we use the same method for the terrorism investigation that you are collecting this for? >> i think the bigger question is why can't the data stay with the providers? >> this is what happens. >> using a hypothetical example, i think, would be helpful. after the 9/11 attacks, we realize that one of the operatives had been living in the u.s. for some time. we learned he had been receiving calls from a known al qaeda safe house in yemen. i think that is a good example. we know the yemeni number, that

is a bad number with reasonable suspicion and ties to a terrorist organization. if we want to do figure out where that number may be connected, the contents of that communication would need to go to multiple providers to ask them to search what number that number had been in contact with. they would have to do a search against their records. they will bring the data back, put it together in short order. the third point i would make is to date there is no legal obligation for any of these companies to hold onto the data. they do it for their own

commercial purposes. tomorrow we could turn around and any of these companies could decide that they do not want to hold onto these records. we could be facing a situation where we would not have the data readily available. these are the things i would have to think through. -- we would have to think through if we went to an alternate model. >> what i was getting at is that you have been saying. there ought to be specific targeted requests. they said that would create all sorts of problems. does he have a point? >> no. i should say that i was last year debating alberto gonzalez, and now i am debating friends who serve in the obama administration.

so much has changed and so much has not changed. the program, whether it is legitimate or not, the answer is illegitimate and illegal in our mind. let's break it down. the 215 standard, it is important to read the words of the law. it defies the knowledge or understanding of the word "relevant" when you are collecting every single phone call, metadata, we will get into that. how is that limited to relevance when you say we have all the phone numbers that are made to and from american citizens. it had me think that the training and relevance -- metadata.

they say, metadata is not content. metadata can give a lot of content. it tells how often i call my mother. who i call on the government. whose private cell phones i happen to have. who i do not call at the office because we cannot want a log of my phone call, but i have a private cell phone. we want keep that somewhat between us. when compiled in complete information can give you a very full picture of what my day is the fourthk amendment does cover the protection of my metadata. let's also talk about section 702. phone calls from overseas and foreigners that do not have the

same kind of standard under 215. i have called them. i have direct phone numbers. david hicks. the man who was killed by the american government by drones, including his 16-year-old son. i have the phone number of his father in yemen. i have the phone numbers for how his wife and brother-in-law in iraq -- we represented him in the 9/11 commission. we have contact with his wife

and his brother-in-law and the man who was held and tortured. these are all individuals who i have their phone numbers. they're all cases i have been involved with. i call them, they call me. as an american citizen, i have a right and an expectation that my communication for which i'm doing my work to defend their right are not to be intercepted under any program. if you were to tell me that my communication had not been caught up in the surveillance program and that none of these programs -- phone numbers i made are not part of your database, i wouldn't believe you because i actually think these are the types of people you are targeting. i have a legitimate right to interact with these individuals.

i have a right and expectation of privacy. >> why can't anthony communicate with his clients without you collecting the records? >> i would say anthony absolutely can communicate with his clients. he has a right to do that. his clients have a right to do that. i disagree with anthony saying -- program is even legal. illegal. in the opinion of all three branches of government, the program is not illegal. the peoples representatives in congress, the court, the pfizer court, and the executive branch all believe this program is illegal. this is important to put in

perspective to things. the fact that a phone call is made to some number that is known to the telephone company and lots of other people, there is no expectation in the fact of the call and the duration of that call it self. clearly, there is an expectation of privacy for which you need a warrant. the reality is that the surveillance program is probably the most regulated national security program we have. the two programs that have been declassified are regulated by the executive branch. congressional oversight has been aware how the executive branch has interpreted section 215 and the judicial branch because they have approved it. that aspect of the judicial branch has been designated by congress to hear these applications has approved of the manner in which this program is

being implemented. there is the equilibrium. if our national political leadership decides they want to change the equilibrium, that is their prerogative and responsibility. >> i want to move the discussion along. i have two more quick questions for raj on this subject. number one, the verizon order that was disclosed that kicked off this whole controversy is due to expire tomorrow. is the nsa seeking a renewal? >> i have nothing to say today about that. >> will you have something to say tomorrow? >> i will. >> will it be modified? [laughter] >> i cannot say anymore at the moment.

>> can i say something in defense of anthony? i want him to continue to love me. i think there should be an expectation of protection, of lawyer and client communications. that has always been the tradition. it is generally respected. there was a 1979 supreme court case referenced this morning. there is no constitutionally protected expectation that phone numbers called will not be disclosed. that is the basis on which we should begin to talk about this. but coming back to congress, congress can narrow whatever is the standard to go before the fisa court to get an individualized warrant.that's what the fourth amendment requires. --re was a decision

i'm sure it will be revisited. it would have required that of the court -- that the case deal with specific facts creating a reasonable suspicion that a person is of a foreign power before the records could be seized and monitored. that is a tighter standard. i think congress will be looking at, in some near lifetime, tightening the standard. i think we need a national debate about this. we are having one right now. >> the 1979 case i was referencing this morning and just now, 1979, how many years has it been? right? it was a primitive register. it would track only numbers being dialed.

now it is vastly different than what we saw in 1979.let's let the supreme court decide if it is relevant. that is the purpose of the lawsuit. i know you love jane, but you have to forgive me. the fisa court, come on. 12 judges. 11 of them republicans. right? there is no one representing the privacy of the people. it is only the government who is represented in the pfizer court. 35 years, three opinions published. >> is there any form of surveillance the nsa can conduct that you would approve of? >> sure. absolutely. it has to be focused on the subject of the surveillance. probable cause. >> who would approve it?

doesn't have to be in secret? >> a revamp of the pfizer court, totally fine. even the chief justice says we need an adversarial process. there is no adversarial process. >> who is the adversary when the government goes in and says, we have a phone number being called by an al qaeda operative, we need to see who that person is right away. who is the adversary who goes before the court to argue? >> you can appoint an ombudsman whose job it is to preserve and present the privacy of the individual. >> last question for now on this subject. we can debate whether privacy rights, metadata are covered or not. the public expects officials will tell them the truth.

when james clapper was asked, if you can give me a yes or no answer to the question, and does the nsa collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of americans and he answered, no, sir -- did anybody from the nsa come into your office and say, we have a problem here? a director has just misled the congress and the public about what we are doing. >> let me make a couple points. the first one is the fact -- he is the director of national intelligence. i think -- and it is available in the public record, a letter was sent explaining what happened in that moment. what i would say, and i don't

know, but i would say when a long time honorable servants make a mistake, sometimes it is a mistake. however, the premise of your question is true. the public expects honest answers. >> i would just add, i have the highest regard for jim clapper. i wish we could roll back the videotape and his answer had been, i cannot answer that question in a public setting. if we moved into a classified setting, i will answered completely. >> let's move on. there are other subjects. you have been very involved in leak investigations. this justice department has brought more leak prosecutions than any other in american

history and the record shows very little to show for it at this moment. you have one success. last week, when the justice department issued his new guidelines for the press and how it will handle investigations and saying that a few of the tactics and techniques that justice has used, the secret subpoena of the phone records, the use of a search warrant to get private e-mails from a reporter under the pretext that he was in violation of the espionage act will not be used anymore. in the last paragraph, they say cases involving the unauthorized disclosure of information are inherently difficult to investigate and prosecute. they require careful use of individuals and proof that may

result in further harmful disclosures. it sounds like a recognition that much of what this justice department has been doing, including your office, has been misplaced. >> not surprisingly, i didn't quite read it that way, but i am happy to answer those questions. let me step back for just a second. it is true my office has been involved in several leak investigations and prosecutions. the context for that from those of you from the west coast who do not have to travel east of-- to the --ation's capital, the part of

that my district covers is home to the largest footprint of the u.s. government in the country. we are home to the pentagon, the cia, the intelligence community, we have the world's largest naval base. we have hundreds of government installations scattered throughout our district. we have thousands of acres of federal land that partially means we have a bit of a national security bull's-eye on our back. it also means that when there are issues involving the unauthorized disclosure of national defense and information which i will talk about in a second, is a much broader group of classified information -- that my district is just sort of the obvious place to bring the investigation. just a bit of context. that is why we are frequently involved in these cases. number two, i think context in terms of numbers is helpful. the numbers are not as large as some of the numbers thrown out in terms of the collection system. in the average year, the justice

department brings between the 50,000 and 75,000 investigations. in the last five years, the justice department has conservatively opened 250,000 to 300,000 investigations. against that backdrop, there have been a half dozen or so investigations into allegations of the unauthorized disclosure of the national defense information. i think it is helpful -- beyond this small but important aspect of enforcing the law. just a last data point before getting to my specific question. much has been written and talked about about the overclassification since 9/11. i think there is really no

daylight between people of all sides and viewpoints, that the government classifies too much information. i think the president has called for lower amounts of classification. that said, when you talk about leak investigations, we use that term as a term of art. there is lots of information that is classified that may be sensitive that you read about in the paper every day. it may be an annoyance to government officials. it may cause some level of alarm and concern by various constituents, but it doesn't mean it's a violation of federal law. in order to bring a criminal case, it is a fairly high

threshold. you need to show this is information that is critical to the national defense, the release of which could benefit a foreign government and/or hurt the united states. >> i think you have gone overboard. >> i don't believe we have. i think the attorney general and others have talked about the reason for the increase in the leak investigation. i think the reasons that have been given are coupled. number one, referrals from the intelligence community, from the cia and others, it has increased in recent years. that is a reflection of a couple of things. a whole lot more people have

access to classified information today than they did before 9/11. number two, this has been discussed on the hill and i am not tech savvy enough to use technical terms here, but essentially, internal i.t. systems make it somewhat easier to be able to determine the source of a particular leak. that is increasingly true today in a way it was not 10 or 15 years ago. >> in one of those cases, you have sought to compel the testimony of the new york times. he has said under no circumstances will he testify and he will go to jail if he has to.

it does seem to be somewhat at a variance with the attorney general's comments last week. if you prevail, are you prepared to put a "new york times" reporter in jail for refusing to testify? >> a couple of things about that. first of all, the administration, including the attorney general, strongly supports and has for several years a shield bill that has been pending. >> you have argued that to the fourth circuit. >> if you will allow me, my understanding of the reporter's privilege -- shield bill, i am told was free to boost yesterday and a bipartisan bill has been introduced in the senate which we get to in a second. my understanding of the bill and i have not read it carefully --

>> i'm not asking about the bill. i am asking about the case. >> right. i think i heard, is there an inconsistency if you support the media shield and that there is not an absolute right for any person, reporter or non-reporter to not provide evidence of a crime? my understanding is that shield bill sets up a test where a federal judge, based on the type of case, the criminal case, would make certain balancing tests. the bill does not say a reporter has no obligation to ever go into court and testify. the media ranks you mentioned are really important. they are significant and certainly will change the way we do business to some extent.

those were a reflection of the attorney general that, oftentimes in washington and elsewhere, policy debates are as much about means as ends. many times they are shared ends. to roll up his sleeves and hear, what is it that's giving you heartburn about the way we are doing business? what are the means we have used historically that perhaps should be revised? there are a couple of them which are significant. the response seems to have been more positive to these new ways.

here are two real big changes in terms of how we will do business. if the government -- let me back up. it has always been the case that seeking records or testimony from a reporter is a last resort. if i can get the information through another source, i am not allowed to ask a reporter a question or ask them to testify in the grand jury. there is an exhaustion requirement which has been strengthened. the attorney general himself or herself needs to now sign off. but critically, the department now, if we wish to issue a subpoena for a tape of a demonstration outside of an embassy, that is an unusual situation. >> can i bring you back?

do you really want to win this case and be faced with whether not you should put the reporter in jail? >> the case is pending. >> and if you win? >> it is a hypothetical. >> do you want to win? >> i need to see what will happen. >> here are the two big changes. if we are going to subpoena a reporter, we need to give advance notice to that reporter. whether it is to the reporter directly, obviously you would have receipt of the subpoena. but if you're going to a third party, you have to tell the reporter and the reporter has the ability to object. number two, and i think this is in reference to the search warrant case. the new regulation says that

unless a reporter is the target of the investigation, there will not be a search warrant sought or e-mail or phone records. the regulations make it very clear that reporters are not going to be prosecuted ever for going about their important business of reporting on the news. >> can we each speak for a second? >> very quickly. >> anthony will rebut what i'm about to say -- and focused on a lot of this for 17 years and i still focus on it. i think the press is by and large very responsible. i participated in a few phone calls to heads of offices, saying, please do not publish information. let's understand what harmful means. sources and methods, when revealed, can result in people dying.

they can also result in our capability going or word against a target, let's say the iranian nuclear program, being compromised. it is not ok, certainly not ok with me to have published information that reveals sources and methods. i am extremely worried about some of the snowden stuff that is not come out yet which may show sources we have in our current efforts to keep america safe. let's understand it. that does not mean a reporter should go to jail, but the context is, there is a responsible press by and large. i certainly respect that.i support the press shield law. we have to find a better way to stop leaks of material that compromise our sources and methods.

>> i want to move onto another subject that is very big and important. that is drone strikes and the future of our war on terror. it has all been predicated on the authorization to use military force after 9/11, which identified our enemy as al qaeda. jay, you gave a major speech in oxford last year looking toward the future. but i am hung up still on the phrase, associated forces. who are the associated forces of al qaeda who are our enemy right now? >> well, you are correct that for the last four years while i was in office, the interpretation that we adopted in the executive branch referred to al qaeda, the taliban, and

the associated forces. that was an interpretation of the executive branch that was endorsed by the courts specifically to include the concept of an associated force. it was also an interpretation that the congress last year in section 1021 embraced. there were some in congress who believed we should not just rely on the lawyers interpretation. -- lawyer's interpretation. let's codify it expressly, which they did in section 1021 which engendered some litigation. they vacated the injunction in that case. when i was in office, and i want to point out that when we conducted military operations pursuant to that authority in places outside of iraq and

afghanistan, like yemen and the horn of africa, every strike was briefed to congress after the strike. i would talk regularly to the lawyers on the armed services committee about how we were construing that authority so that they understood how it was being applied. during the time i was in office, that authority generally worked against core al qaeda, osama bin laden being the most prominent example. other members of core al qaeda. al qaeda in the arabian peninsula, and al qaeda- affiliated elements. >> there were three associated forces when you're in office. >> those were the three that i had the occasion to evaluate most often.

there were other instances where i would conduct a legal evaluation where we did not go forward with a specific operation, but those are the three most prominent examples that we regularly briefed to congress. you referred to my oxford speech. i think we are at an inflection point, as one journalist put it, where we should no longer consider ourselves in a traditional armed conflict against al qaeda and affiliated groups. i think benghazi is a prominent example of what i am talking about. you cannot label the benghazi attack as something conducted by al qaeda and associated forces. it was more of a mixed bag. in this period, i think we need to evaluate in congress what new authorities we might need -- and we're not just talking about

drone strikes. we're talking about the ability to conduct interrogations and other types of things that domestic law enforcement, that the intelligence community should have to go forward with to the future. >> can i add something to this? i just want to give a shout out to jay. he has been fearless. at the wilson center last week, we had a national conversation. the amuf, whether it be amended or ended. a republican from tennessee, the ranking member said, congress is being irresponsible. this statute which i voted for, was never anticipated to be in effect 12 years later and be the basis for all of our tactics

against the bad guys forever and ever. this is a debate congress should have and if it isn't being had by congress, the larger society should have it. what is our basis for our going forward on who is attacking us and what tactics are appropriate? what is the narrative? let's not forget that. what does the united states stand for? i doubt anyone really disagrees with that. i think it is just time to get on with it. i want to applaud jay. >> my former colleague wrote an excellent book, "kill or capture." learning about afterwards, if i was catholic i would have to go to confession. learning about afterwards, if i was catholic i would have to go to confession. what did you feel guilty about? >> any time i or any other

national security official had to sign off on something that leads to lethal force, that should leave you with a heavy heart. period. irrespective of who the objective is. i want to talk about the op-ed written today. i read it. the reality is that in a congressionally authorized conflict, on occasion people who are not targeted by the strike are killed. the good news to the extent that there is any is with our modern technology, we are more precise. collateral damage is minimized. our government in may, because a number of officials, including the president, believes that if the u.s. government takes a life of a

u.s. citizen, the government should acknowledge that. acknowledged that the u.s. government was responsible for his son and others. the way the attorney general put it, they were not specifically targeted. the point i want to make is that for any responsible official of our government involved in counterterrorism, you read an op-ed like that and you get a pit in your stomach and read it with a heavy heart. if you don't, you should not be involved in making these decisions. >> i will let you answer, but there is limited time from -- for questions from the audience. if anyone wants to pose one, now is the time to do so. i have one right over here.

>> from foreign affairs magazine, the new york times has likened the fisa court to an almost parallel supreme court in that it is issuing decisions and constitutional interpretations that will shape intelligence practices in the future. that -- doagree with you agree with that characterization? should the fisa court be playing that role? or should the supreme court be taking on some of those cases? >> the fisa court is operating as congress established in 19 78. i think everyone knows how it operates. these are federal, article three judges. there is a review that has ruled rarely, but it has. i think that narrative generally sets out there. is a rubber stamp.

few applications are rejected and there is a handful of people in this room who have practiced. them. there is no way that is an accurate representation. i think the challenge to the government is how do we improve public confidence in a process that is working as intended, working pretty well. there is a full-time staff that is very competent. i think that is something that is out of their. the idea that a certain number of applications are never rejected. a couple of points. one, if somebody were to make critical side, it is rare a title iii is rejected as well. that is just the nature of the business. applications are well. together through the process. but two, in recent weeks, we started to open up a little bit more to discuss how the process works. there is something many of you have probably heard of called a recopy. before we file with them, we filed with is --it is a draft

application. i could be days, weeks, months before it is submitted. the government takes that into account. they tell us what changes might be necessary. final submission might not be made, and even when it is made, it accounts for what the judges would have put in originally. there is a legitimate debate as to whether reform should be made. i would just like to make that point. >> a question right here. letefore that, let's anthony chime in. >> there is a vigorous process. let's make it a real vigorous. let's have an adversarial process in our legal system. if you think it is tough to practice before now, i would love to be opposite you. i think that's the way our

courts normally work. i think the fact is the numbers have not been revealed. i think it is fascinating all of you cosponsors of this institute for him are now asking congress and the court to release more data on that information. finally understood that your self interest is corporation aligned with your consumers privacy interest. you are late to the party but it is good that you got there. let me fall off of the limb. i have been watching this whole debate about edward snowden. i think he did this country a service. i have not said that publicly until this point. i think he did his country a service by starting a debate that was anemic and left to government officials were people did not understand fully what was happening. i think regardless of where you come out on it, we have a

debate. we have six lawsuits that have been filed on the nsa program. we have congress holding hearings yesterday, saying, wait a minute, that is not the law but i signed. i find it rather troublesome when i find the white house press secretary goes to such great lengths to say that he is not a human rights activists and he is not a whistleblower. humande him king of the rights committee? >> i cannot let this stand. criminallyide who is charged -- messagenk it is a bad for us to send to people who decide to take the law into their own hands, they are doing a public disservice. -- that they are doing a public service. >> the system does not work. we have sued seven times to get this before a proper court. we were kicked out.

they said it was a cascade of speculation when our client said that we think our data was collected by the government. since we had no proof we had no standing. if it had not been for lack of trying -- it was not for a lack of trying. the only way we can get before the court, is because mr. snowden leads the fact that we are clients of the verizon business mentor. network. he fits my standard progress and our democracy, regardless of if you broke the law, regardless of that he should be held in the fourth circuit, i think our country is better as a result. >> our country needs a debate, but i do not think -- >> that is -- >> this is completely different. a kid who had nothing to do with formulating the policy.

he is totally self-centered and narcissistic. it is not just the information about these programs. it is a whole bunch of other stuff which compromises ongoing investigations. this guy needs to seek public asylum from other countries because he would be persecuted here, it's total nonsense. a lot of americans support what he did. he should come back and face a fair trial. >> private manning street before he was prosecuted by our government was torture. now, i want to say that i may not agree. ifhave not decided if he -- we will defend mr. snowden. we had nothing to do with his application. that he can go find elsewhere. i will say that i am personally grateful that we are having a debate we should've had long ago. i have been in my job 13 years. we have tried to have this debate all throughout.

we have not had the hearings in congress. we have not had the lawsuits that have been filed. we never had our european allies who now raise questions about whether the government's efforts were with our allies. for whatever it's worth, i think we are better off today, and now, knowing about the nsa program than we were back in march of this year. >> do you want to weigh in? >> reedley, just to say that the case anthony mentioned is an ongoing case. -- briefly, just to say that the case anthony mentioned is an ongoing case. about ittalk specifically. what i can say clearly and forcefully isthe justice department does not pursue whistleblowers. that has been used.

a my district prosecuted former cia official last year who had signed nine nondisclosure agreements. he was convicted and keep pled guilty. -- he admitted that he added -- outedhe out to the name of a covert agent and a highly classified program. he talked to people in the intelligence community, many of whom are sitting here. i am always told that the most damaging leaks are outing covert agents. the case that we prosecuted involved both. he never claimed he was a whistleblower. that was a self-serving thing that was claimed. years later. when he was sentenced, the judge who was the judge in the other case said to him, you are not a whistleblower. >> we have a question or in the outing to us had the microphone.

>> i love a good debate. in q2 the panelists. -- -- thank you. i am with human rights first. the team seems to be about information. i want to ask you about a slightly different topic which is torture. the intelligence community did a study of torture after 9/11. they searched through 3 million documents or 25,000 footnotes. those that were adopted have not yet been voted for declassification. isn't this something the american people deserve to know? fore was a similar study the military's role. that has been made public. >> do you want to take a crack at that? >> i think the answer is yes. i think the report that was

done by the senate armed committee is a very valuable report. i personally had a number of takeaways from it. i think that the legal reviews that were done to authorize a particular interrogation were not done in a proper way. i think the senior lawyer of the department of defense should have been more personally involved in conducting those reviews. i think that is an important study. >> any other questions here on this side? and then we will continue. how was going to ask gene, do we ensure a robust debate on public policy issues that

involve intelligence operations when they are classified within certain members of congress? to the oversight committees cannot share? been tradition has always that members of the intelligence committees that she deducted on there unless you are a leader. sources and methods have to be protected. i often joke that congress does not leap to kiss you do not have any information. but actually, some members of congress do and i was one of those members. should congress nonetheless even with a higher level of information shared only with the intelligence committee conduct robust debates? you bet. doingss is capable of this. are they going to do this in the near term? i doubt it. that is what bob was saying.

it is a huge abdication of responsibility. it will take a bipartisan group. those folks seem to get along with each other. there should be a debate. somebody suggested maybe we need a national security act of 2014. think about that. the national security act,most of it was passed in 19 47. no business on the planet could operate within 1947 business model. we change part of it. did we change part of it in 2004 when we adopted intelligence reform. it wasn't perfect. it was opposed, so we had to make some compromises. at least it made a modern horizontal structure. congress should revisit this issue and the responsible. maybe out here in washington

and other places like the wilson center, we ought to start that debate. anthony romero is part of that debate. we have had lots of programs where he has participated. we need the point of view of the press and the folks who have been in and are in our intelligence community, we need to public perception. the last point is that security and liberty are not a zero sum game. united one -- more of one and less of the other. they are a positive sum game or a negative sum game. that would be a catastrophe. --i think when it comes to it would be a catastrophe to shred the fourth amendment. >> i think when it comes to leaks, there really is a big picture point that has to be made. we have a 9/11 or fort hood or boston marathon and everybody in washington ask, what happened?

what failed, how can we do better? they are not conducting -- connecting the dots enough. we have to do a better job. and then you get a manning or a snowden and people say, what happened? how can we do better? you connected to many dots. you gave too many people access to information. the pendulum swings back the other way. the reality is, and a lot of people don't want to hear this, if they are somebody determined to commit a criminal act, if there was a summer intern in my office, determined to get into my office, and snatched from my desktop a top-secret document and give it away, you'll probably be able to figure out a way to do that and to break through all the barriers that exist. we don't necessarily need to think about changing national security policy in reaction to

one criminal event. >> they will have to avoid criminal prosecution. on that point, apparently we are out of time. i want to thank our panelists for a great discussion. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] withre from this event deputy secretary ashton carter. he talks about the future of the pentagon as it draws down operations in afghanistan and iraq and focuses on other issues like cyber security and counter- terrorism. this is one hour.

you, walter, ash, for joining us. thank you for letting this go through the hardships of leaving 97-degree weather in washington to come out here. you do not mind if we stay this month and next month, do you? it is wonderful to be here with the deputy secretary of defense, an old friend of many years. i will not say how many. somebody told me first came to the aspen institute to study charged particles and what else? the exposly days of boson.iggs >> he asked if in the first 40 minutes he could do a small slide presentation.

[laughter] we asked his security team to put a bullet through the projector. dive right in. we're going to have a fairly broad conversation about where uponre in the pivot receipt in the pentagon, the pivot to asia, drones, and so on. we are ourselves out an incredible pivot point. ended one war and are rapidly exiting a second thing you are thinking about exiting even more rapidly than your admitted to. a sequester cuts. i want to know how you manage the pit --.

pivot. what are the opportunities and risks? what do we need to be invested in? >> that is our daily preoccupation. you are right. we are far from washington. in washington, everyone is focused on the budget. that is important because we are undergoing a reduction in the defense bar get negative -- in the defense budget that is as large as deep as the post- vietnam and post-cold war production. it is large and consequential. i can get to that later. .ou started on the right note the other huge transition before us is the transition from the first 9/11 decade, which was characterized by two wars in two particular places, of one particular kind, mainly

counterinsurgency. also, the first post-9/11 decade of wrestling with the counter-terrorism problem. those were the rigging, .efining, daily preoccupations you cannot be any other way when you have responsibility in the department of defense and you have troops at war. i spent an enormous amount of my time on afghanistan. i still and will for some time to come simply because we have people there. at the same time, we all know that era is coming to an end. we need to turn our minds and tos from the set of problems the opportunities and challenges that are going to define our future. is the titanic transition

we're trying to make the department of defense under go right now. what does that mean? >first of all, we need to get back to some issues we have a bit overye off of the last decade. weapons of mass destruction is one of those. we need to get back to from a military point of view some areas of warfare where potential opponents have crept up on us over the last 10 years. we need to reinvest and get back in the game. more on that later. we need to do new things in counterterrorism. ,e also have some opportunities huge opportunities. the biggest one you mentioned is to shift the great weight of our institution that is focused

intellectually and physically for 10 years on iraq and afghanistan to a part of the to define the american future. that is the asia pacific theater. you will see that happening. you will see that in terms of troops there. you will see it in terms of aircraft there. you will see it in terms of ships there. investments made, of particular importance to the theater. in new bomb, for example. --ew variant of the v.a. virginia submarine and some space and other things we do not talk about because we hope they take people by surprise. the military dimension of a shift that has a politico-military dimension with

our reinvigorating our alliance with japan. everybody knows china is a rising military power. japan is the rise in military power in east asia also. south korea, the countries of southeast asia. our old friends like australia and thailand on to india, which is a natural security partner for the united states for a variety of reasons. we're trying to turn our attention to the asia-pacific theater. this is the kind of strategic transition we are trying to manage. at the same time, we're having this enormous budget reduction. you look at the new capabilities and problems. i mentioned a number of them. one of great importance is cyber. we are making new investments in cyber as well.

all in all, this is a moment in department of your of defense not seen since the wall fell in 1989 in terms of the need for us to do things differently. we do understand that. we understand people want us to spend less money. more importantly, they want us to spend it better and smarter. we understand that. we also understand the country needs us to shift our attention away from iraq and afghanistan and the first counter-terrorism decade. the next decade will be different from the first decade in many ways. >> let me pull on one string of the willhave described have general alexander later. way, the